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1Sustained Monopolistic Business Relationships: A UK Defence
Procurement Case
Abstract
Business-to-business relationships within sustained monopolies, such as those within UK Defence
Procurement, have received scant attention by Management Researchers. This is unusual because
under these market circumstances there appear to be few incentives to achieve mutually beneficial
outcomes despite their strategic policy importance. This paper argues that an understanding of the
monopolistic environment using a Transaction Cost Economics theoretical framework and
Relationship Marketing concepts provides an approach to solving this problem as well as testing
aspects of these disciplines empirically in a novel area. This plan is supported by the results from a
Pilot Study and the paper concludes by proposing a substantial research project to test this hypothesis
in the UK Defence Procurement situation.
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Introduction
This paper addresses an under-researched area of business-to-business relationships, namely the
relationship which exists where one or both parties has a monopoly of supply or demand (Fishwick,
1993). Many theories of buyer-seller relationships have discussed in general terms the concept of
structural bonds and opportunism, but not adequately applied them to the extreme situation of
monopoly buyer and monopoly seller relationships. We first summarise the difficulties faced by the
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its major industrial suppliers in moving away from traditional,
adversarial relationships whilst facing increasingly monopolistic business dealings. We then justify the
use of a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) model as a theoretical lens through which to view the
problem. Because Relationship Marketing (RM) provides an effective framework for describing
business-to-business relationships, this paper argues that its concepts can be used to address the
problems identified when viewed through the TCE theoretical lens and at the same time enabling a
better understanding of the dynamics of sustained monopolistic business relationships. The authors
finally propose an exploratory research programme within the UK Defence Procurement (DP)
environment to test the approach.
UK DP
Historically, the relationship between the UK MoD and the UK Defence Industries has been
adversarial. On one hand, with equipment expenditure of £10,082 million in 2000/01 (DASA, 2000),
the UK MoD has immense power as British industry’s largest single customer. It can thus determine
the ‘size, structure, conduct, ownership and performance of the industry through pricing, profitability,
2technical progress and exports’ (Hartley 1998). On the other hand, industry is a major exporter and
contributor to the UK’s balance of payments, its production for foreign sales reduces UK MoD’s
equipment unit costs, it develops strategically important technologies such as aero engines and is a
significant employer in UK industrial areas. Lastly, the major UK Defence companies are virtual
domestic monopolies and can team with foreign companies to further reduce the choice of supplier.
The UK MoD/industrial supplier relationship is thus dominated by a monopoly market in which each
side wields considerable power but where lack of trust and the option to leave often reduces
efficiency, increases costs and offers little incentive to co-operate (Humphries & Wilding, 2001,
Palmer, 2001, Parker & Hartley 1997). Against this background, in the 1999 UK Defence White Paper
(Cm 4446, 1999) the Government stated that its Smart Acquisition initiative depended heavily on the
concept of partnership in order to reap the benefits of competition and collaboration. It is this
challenging and potentially mutually exclusive business objective that drives a need for research in
this area.
The Monopoly Environment
In our search of the literature for a suitable model with which to examine the relationship conditions
within a monopoly, we first considered 2 relationship power perspectives. Michael Porter’s (1980) five
forces model of competitive advantage considers business relationships are characterised by a short-
term orientation, arms-length competition and the exercise of market power (Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000).
However, although participants may aim to achieve market dominance by limiting competition through
the creation of barriers to entry, this does not accurately represent UK DP monopolies where equally
powerful ‘partners’ can be locked in a ‘deadly embrace’ from which neither can escape. An
alternative view is provided by Andrew Cox et al (2000) who see the combination of resource utility
and scarcity creating a power regime in which the involved parties will employ adversarial/non-
adversarial and arms-length/collaborative arrangements depending on their relative power positions.
These options are shown in the matrix at Figure 1.
TAKE IN FIGURE 1
Quadrant 1 suggests limited information, resource sharing and the buyer/supplier aiming to obtain a
greater share of the exchange value. In quadrant 2 a long-term, balanced relationship is sought
where there is little sharing of specific assets but both parties gain some strategic benefit. In quadrant
3, the parties work closely together and share sensitive information and costly resources. However,
3the dominant partner intends to take a disproportionate share of the returns. In quadrant 4, both sides
enjoy a close, collaborative, equal arrangement, often called a ‘partnership’. Although this approach
offers a perspective on the appropriate use of power within a business relationship, it was optimised
for use in ‘normal’ markets. In UK DP, where neither party has choice over the selection of
relationship strategy and where equality of power really means equally disempowered, the
Relationship Power Analysis matrix in Figure 1 fails to provide a robust framework for extending
thinking on long-term, monopoly relationships.
In a review of the contracting and TCE literatures, we noted that when the cost of managing the risk
associated with human factors such as opportunism became too high, the market could break down
and force a firm to internalise the business, in effect creating an internal monopoly (Faulkner & de
Rond, 2000). However, TCE treats the monopoly phenomenon as a short-term, highly undesirable
market aberration which would normally be dealt with by government anti-trust regulation (Williamson,
1996). We have nevertheless adapted Oliver Williamson’s (1975) Economic Organisations Failure
Framework in Figure 2 to show the influences that create and sustain a monopolistic relationship and
borne in mind that for the majority of major contracts in UK DP, monopoly is considered to be in the
public interest (Fishwick, 1993).
TAKE IN FIGURE 2
However, although both sides need to rely on maintaining close relationships over the supply of highly
specialised goods (Grant, 1995), inevitably they are open to opportunistic behaviour (self-interest
seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975)). This is especially the case since Sir Peter, now Lord Levene
ended MoD’s ‘cosy relationship’ with industry in 1985 (Hartley, 1998) which introduced uncertainty and
complexity into the market. In seeking to obtain public expenditure value for money the UK MoD
attempts to drive down industry’s profit to a ‘reasonable’ level and in turn the contractor attempts to
inflate the view of his costs to ensure the best possible rate of return. This deliberate obfuscation is
information impactedness (selective information disclosures, and distortions which are difficult or
expensive to verify at the time and which undermine the durability of contract arrangements) (Liston-
Heyes, 1995). The consequences are that industry loses its incentive to perform better and, the UK
MoD reduces the resources available to industry that might have been used to fund important
Research and Development. This is bounded rationality where people have only so much capacity to
rationalise what is going on around them and therefore naturally limit their performance to the
4adequate rather than the optimum (Simon, 1957). The sum effect is the creation of an adversarial
relationship without the freedom to look to the market for alternatives (Parker & Hartley, 1997) and the
formation of small numbers/monopoly situation. Although the authors can find no empirical research
using Williamson's (1975) Framework in similar circumstances, it seems to have face validity because
the factors it represents are readily observable in the UK DP situation (Humphries & Wilding, 2000).
We have therefore decided to use it as the basis of our theoretical framework with which to investigate
this unusual situation. We now turn to a critical review of RM with the intention of determining the
extent to which its business-to-business relational concepts can provide a means of understanding the
dynamics within sustained monopolistic conditions and especially those found between the UK
Ministry of Defence and its industrial suppliers.
The Importance of Relationships in Marketing
An RM view of marketing is that it aims to establish, develop and maintain successful relational
exchanges which involves designing and negotiating strategic partnerships with vendors and
technology partners through which the firm deploys its distinctive competencies to serve market
opportunities (Webster, 1992). The RM literature also provides comprehensive views of the various
styles used by firms and individuals when they do business with each other. These perspectives do
not just draw on Marketing for inspiration but also on Behavioural Psychology (Simon, 1957),
Sociology (Naude & Buttle, 2000), and Organisation (Hatch, 1997). Such approaches might seem to
be simplistic but at the fundamental level social relations shape and define the nature of synergistic
interactions between firms (Madhok, 2000) and may provide a starting point from which to understand
an essentially uncharted area. This section of the paper therefore uses RM concepts to explore the
business drivers, the development of various theories, the key variables and their relevance to
monopolistic business-to-business relationships.
Drivers for Closer Business Relationships
In the last 20 years competitive pressures have forced companies to become more reactive to
satisfying rapidly changing, specific customer needs in global markets and prompted a search for
reduced transaction costs and more efficient, agile processes (Christopher, 1997). Firstly, quality
systems, such as Total Quality Management, have encouraged ‘reverse marketing’ starting with the
customer (demand driven/flexible manufacturing) and moving back to procurement process
efficiencies (reduced cycle times and inventory) (Lewin & Johnston, 1997). Secondly, Supply Chain
5optimisation has stimulated the use of IS tools and networks and highlighted the importance of
relationships involving fewer, key suppliers to build competitive advantage (Wilson, 1995). This
competitive advantage includes access to new technologies, information, skills and markets,
increased capabilities to provide a wider range of products and services and, improved management
that realises the importance of customer satisfaction, customer retention and relationships to the firm’s
performance (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). More recently Supply Chain Management describes a
business environment in which firms closely co-operate rather than compete to achieve mutual goals
(Perks & Easton, 2000). In summary, when allied to a concentrating and globalising trend of business,
these factors have produced a dramatic shift from domestic, transactional sourcing to a New
Procurement Paradigm based upon global, relational sourcing (Sheth & Sharma, 1997).
The MoD and its industrial partners have felt the same winds of change. The ending of the Cold War
in 1989 removed the concept of ‘Defence at any cost’ and instead the MoD has been driven
relentlessly by operational, financial and political pressures to become smaller, flatter and more
flexible by using out-sourcing, rationalisation, redundancies and stock reduction programmes (Cm
4446, 1999). More recently the Smart Acquisition Initiative (Hansard, 2000) introduced more
streamlined processes under the banner: faster, cheaper, better and stated that partnering would
allow it to overcome the adversarial relationships within a Defence market containing few competitors
(MoD/CBI 1988). However, despite clear strategic intentions, practical implementation of partnering
arrangements by the MoD has been slow, patchy and clouded by uncertainty over ways and means
(Humphries & Wilding, 2001).
Relationship Marketing Theory Development
Early emphasis was on discrete transactions, planning, control and profit maximisation and the
primary focus of the exchange relationship was precluding killing and stealing (Dwyer et al, 1987).
Known as Sales Management, this thrived in large organisations in the 1970s and 80s and usually
operated in an adversarial mode (McDonald et al, 1997). As organisations migrated from bureaucratic
hierarchies to more flexible and decentralised structures and buyer-seller relationships become less
adversarial, the role of marketing within the firm changed. The Japanese Keiretsu suggested
avoidance of confrontation as a solution to disputes (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993) and required discrete
market transactions to be displaced by closer, long-term relationships. Furthermore, the concept of
value creation through collaboration rather than exchange depended on purposeful co-operation using
6a web of operational and interpersonal connections and structures (Dyer & Chu, 2000) and could
extend to groups of co-operating, similar product/service companies known as sourced, service
consortia (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2000). Partnership has many definitions but is generally a
purposive, strategic relationship between independent firms sharing compatible goals and striving for
mutual benefit (Palmer, 2001). Linkage takes place in form and substance that goes beyond the
conventional flow of products and paper (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Firms are also likely to be
involved in more than one type of relationship at any time and will classify suppliers/customers
according to their importance and business complexity and adopt a portfolio approach to create and
manage relationships appropriately (Olsen & Ellram, 1997).
Next, the idea of Industrial Networks saw pairs of firms in dyadic relationships forming focal, value-
added partnerships and, together with a secondary network of other firms, managing the flow of goods
and services around a specific market opportunity (Anderson et al, 1994). Hakan Hakansson’s
European Industrial Marketing Group (IMP) sought richer meaning in these relationships where the
degree of closeness between network interactiond was termed ‘embeddedness’ (Metcalf et al, 1992).
Relationships were seen as valuable resources and investments capable of increasing economic and
technological efficiency and serving as information channels and means of reducing uncertainty.
Another perspective was the Marriage Analogy that saw building and sustaining customer
relationships (McDonald et al, 1997) as requiring similar relationship qualities to those in marriage. As
a result of dealing closely with a partner a firm achieved reduced uncertainty, managed dependence,
exchange efficiency and social satisfaction (Dwyer et al, 1987, Tuten & Urben, 2001). Additionally, the
arrangement required bilateral investment, a long-term perspective and the avoidance of legal
remedies to secure co-operation (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993, Gummesson, 1999). Finally, the New
Marketing Paradigm emphasised the strategic importance of relationship building and maintenance by
the appointment of senior managers to devote high level expertise and management to this key task
as Key Account Managers (MacDonald et al, 1997).
Within monopolistic UK DP relationships transactional business has been the norm but given the drive
to seek synergistic benefits, efforts have been made to forge improved relationships between the main
protagonists of a dyadic nature. But, the lack of network dynamics has reduced the effectiveness of
attempts to discover ‘common ground’ on which to establish ‘embeddedness’ and few incentives to
7dispel adversarial practices have excluded the Keiretsu option. The Marriage Analogy, on the other
hand, has been dismissed as imprecise and misleading in the context of many markets characterised
by firms having multiple simultaneous relationships. However, in the case of UK DP a much stronger
case seems possible for its relevance although a key limitation is the impossibility of ‘divorce’. Finally,
the MoD has appointed senior people to take responsibility for managing specific relationships or key
accounts.
Relationship Variables
We next address the key variables used within RM theories in order to identify the important relational
features that build and sustain successful business-to-business relationships. A summary of these
together with the authors who proposed them as issues is in Figure 3.
TAKE IN FIGURE 3
Trust and Commitment
Our treatment of trust and commitment is combined because these variables are highly intertwined in
a rich seam of business, organisational and behavioural interactions. Moreover, many writers have
remarked on this complexity and highlighted their importance to the stability and productiveness of
business-to-business relationships (Faulkner & de Rond, 2000, Frow, 2001, Morgan and Hunt, 1994,
Sheth & Sharma, 1997).
Trust is a complex entity, which is not easy to measure (Gulati, 1995). It has an extensive literature
and for the sake of maintaining a clear focus on the business-to-business relationship area, this review
takes a simplified perspective. Trust enables co-operative behaviour, promotes improved
relationships, reduces harmful conflict and allows effective response in a crisis (Doney & Cannon,
1997). Trust requires risk (a perceived probability of loss) (Cowles, 1997), uncertainty (over the
intentions of the other party) (Doney & Cannon, 1997), interdependence (where the interests of one
party cannot be achieved without reliance on the other) (Kumar, 1996) and choice (alternative options
are available) as essential conditions. Both Economics and Games Theory see trust as a stable
phenomenon that either exists or doesn’t (Williamson, 1996, Axelrod, 1984). Others see it as being
‘caused’ (e.g. by previous good experience, institutional reputation, commitment) and affecting factors
such as openness, reliability and honesty (Goleman, 1998). A further assessment is a combination of
all these elements in a complex interaction between parties which sometimes requires a leap in faith
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(Kumar, 1996). Therefore, in an era of more flexible organisation forms, there is a shift from
institutional to relational trust (Rousseau et al, 1998) which links to the development of RM itself.
Trust is of crucial importance in industrial and marketing contexts (Cowles, 1997) and manifested
when a party has fundamental belief/confidence that the other partner will act reliably and with integrity
in the best interests of the other (Kramer, 1999). There is little doubt that repeated cycles of exchange,
risk-taking and successful fulfillment of expectations strengthens the willingness of parties to rely upon
each other and, as a result expand the relationship – in effect producing a virtuous circle that can be
developed and promoted (Goleman, 1998).
Commitment is viewed as an outcome of trust because without it, the relationship lacks credibility and
growth potential (Naude & Buttle, 2000). Commitment is defined variously in the literature as the
belief by an exchange partner that the relationship with another is so important as to warrant
maximum effort to maintain it indefinitely (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). The desire to expend considerable
additional effort in building the relationship is a recurring theme as is an implicit or explicit pledge or
enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship (Moorman et al, 1992, Wilson, 1995). At the
interactive level there can be an implication of stability, loyalty and sacrifice in both interorganisational
and interpersonal dealings.
It is difficult to understand how trust and commitment might thrive in the monopoly environment
envisaged by Williamson (1975). We have speculatively modified Morgan and Hunts (1994)
Commitment-Trust Theory in Figure 4 to illustrate the problems.
TAKE IN FIGURE 4
Information Impactedness and Bounded Rationality have been added as negative influences. The
model defines Reduced Propensity to Leave as a significant outcome. However, in a UK DP
monopoly neither side is free to quit and this would instead provide a further negative input to
Relationship Commitment and exclude the beneficial influence of Relationship Termination Costs.
The addition of these factors might make the attainment of the model’s positive outcomes rather more
difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, a number of successful relationships are visible within UK DP
monopolies so it must be possible to promote co-operative behaviours that break out of the
Organisations Failure Framework’s downward spiral and enter Goleman’s (1998) virtuous circle where
9integrity breeds credibility which in turn breeds further integrity. Writers are clear that both trust and
commitment require an enormously challenging learning curve to deliver effectively but, the benefits
are better customer service, superior communication and increased joint profitability (Dyer & Chu,
2000). In summary, although trust and commitment are strong, supportive factors that are
communicated explicitly by action and without which a sound relational exchange will fail to deliver full
benefits, quite how they affect the dynamics of monopolistic, UK DP relationships is unknown.
Co-operation, Co-ordination and Collaboration (C3Behaviour)
These closely related variables are termed ‘C3 Behaviour’ in this paper. Co-operative, co-ordinating
and collaborative behaviour is defined as working together/jointly to bring resources into a required
relationship to achieve effective operations in harmony with the strategies/objectives of the parties
involved, thus resulting in mutual benefit (Axelrod, 1984, Humphries & Wilding, 2001, Oliver, 1990,
Stern & Reve, 1980). These views describe the boundary markers within which productive
relationships can take place (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). C3 Behaviour actions are similar or
complementary, co-ordinated actions needed to achieve mutual outcomes with reciprocation over time
(McDonald et al, 1997). At a higher level, C3 Behaviour rather than pure exchange is used to create
real value; an organisational competence known as ‘collaborative advantage’ which requires
developed mechanisms, structures, skills and processes (Moss Kanter, 1994, Rugman & D’Cruz,
2000). A more product-oriented approach requires collaboration or coalescing between buyers and
sellers to produce quality products and reduce costs (Metcalf et al, 1992). It appears that C3
Behaviour is a complete antithesis of those potentially found in monopolistic relationships where
concentration on safeguarding against opportunism endangers the level and quality of co-operation
and adversely affects the level of value attained through collaboration (Madhok, 2000). And yet in a
growing climate of reducing UK Defence spending and market concentration, perhaps the driving
motivation to use C3 Behaviour might be survival rather than a simple desire to leverage mutual
capabilities.
Long-term Orientation
A long-term orientation is an essential prerequisite for moving away from adversarial relationship. It
suggests continuity, stability, predictability and working together consistently to achieve sustained
competitive advantage and an opportunity to build trust and commitment (Oliver, 1990). This attitude
is also instrumental in increased morale, co-operation and improved dispute settlement procedures
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(Lewin & Johnston, 1997). Unfortunately the Defence Procurement business has always be
characterised by short-termism due to the limited Parliamentary spending horizons that are often
characterised by ‘stop-go’ policies and this uncertainty introduces a strong source of bounded
rationality and limited vision. The result is incongruity and tension where short-term behaviour is
promoted within an inescapable, long-term relationship and it would be interesting to probe this
phenomenon to discover if it is possible to reconcile the two.
Interdependence, Power and Conflict
A relationship will not survive unless both sides are dependent upon each other to achieve their
objectives and loss in individual autonomy is compensated through the expected gains (Mohr &
Spekman, 1994, Rugman & D’Cruz, 2000). A key outcome of interdependence is reduced temptation
to act opportunistically and thus to prolong the relationship (Lewin & Johnston, 1997).
Interdependence is built and reinforced by both parties investing in the relationship. Such investments
are likely to be non-retrievable such as funds, equipment, IS, tacit knowledge, skills and management
time (Sheth & Sharma, 1997). Power-play also determines whether an interdependent relationship
will survive. Power is a complex variable with both beneficial and destructive properties, even when
not exercised overtly. Unbalance, or asymmetry, can make one partner susceptible to the power and
influence of the other (Hatch, 1997) and, as already mentioned at the beginning of this paper, can be
the basis of a deliberate business strategy (Cox et al, 2000). However, this need not be destabilising
as long as the perception of equity (a relationship between equals (Watson, 1999)) remains in terms of
sharing the outcomes and participation in the venture. Destructive conflict (opponent-centred
behaviour (Stern & Reve, 1980)) should not be confused with functional conflict (creative abrasion
(Eisenhardt et al, 1997)). The latter’s freedom to disagree takes place in an atmosphere of trust and
not only enables the productive resolution of disagreements but also produces innovation from
teamwork (Hatch, 1997). The table at Figure 5 shows a comparison of the destructive aspects of
power, monopoly and trust. Neither power nor trust quite accurately sums-up the monopoly situation
where you will find that mutual imprisonment without an exit option or means of complaint
(Gummesson, 1999) limits freedom of action and mutually disempowers. For example, contracts will
necessarily be long term but they may not be open or informal and more often than not infested with
opportunism and adversarialism. Additionally there will be no opportunity to choose partners with
11
‘appropriate values’ and a negotiating strategy is likely to be both constrained and empowered by
having only one partner.
TAKE IN FIGURE 5
Adaption and Communication
A different type of investment is that which adapts to the needs of the relationship. Examples are
products, procedures, inventory management, attitudes, values and goals and these mark a
commitment to maintain the relationship. The extent to which adaptions are made will depend on the
type and complexity of the product/service, the depth of information exchanged and the extent of
organisational social and operational contacts and degree of co-operation required (Metcalf et al,
1992). Multi-level, intensive communications are essential in successful relationships (Moss Kanter,
1994). They flow through honest, open channels from joint planning and goal setting where mutual
expectations are established and measured and allow the breadth and depth of the complex
interaction to be managed (Gaski, 1984). At the operational level, clear guidelines on the sharing of
proprietary information and technology influence product development, costs, sales and revenues and
increase commitment (Wilson, 1995). Such is the degree of technical and design complexity within
UK DP that adaption and communication must be viewed as key relational success factors. However,
the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) is often the factor that defines the monopoly and is a root
cause of disagreement and discontent. Moreover, adaption and communication may be exercised
under mutual duress rather than within a spirit of willing, openness.
Building Relationship Management
In the last few sections a number of key relationship variables have been reviewed. Leading from
them, the table in Figure 6 summarises a number of practical, normative management measures that
can be taken to build and sustain a business partnership but which also appear relevant to the UK DP
situation with its more challenging problems.
TAKE IN FIGURE 6
A management philosophy or corporate culture needs to be developed where companies can operate
in a climate of trust and openness (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Perhaps this can be accomplished by
changing the reward systems which reinforce the behaviours that generate trust, mutual goals and
adaption (Wilson, 1995) but, the difficulty of changing the mindsets of staff should not be
underestimated (Sheth & Sharma, 1997). The importance of rich interpersonal relationships to the
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growth of trust is often mentioned, but there is an alternative pragmatic view where close personal
relationships are not essential and where enlightened self-interest operates such that both press hard
for advantage but stay within their trust compact (Kumar, 1996). In the final analysis, business
relationships depend on clearly understanding each other’s needs and the maintenance of an agreed
framework within which to prosecute shared objectives. It is possible that in a monopoly this
framework can never be more than an uneasy truce.
A Theoretical Framework for Research
The development of Relationship Marketing thinking appears to have mirrored that of the UK MoD and
its industrial suppliers such that both see the need for strategic interaction at a relational rather than a
transactional level (CM 4446, 1999). Moreover, they understand they must put aside their traditional
approach based upon the power game (Kumar, 1996) and embrace partnering principles base upon
trust (Watson, 1999). However, implementing these concepts appears to be extremely difficult,
potentially because of the monopolistic aspects of their situation. The RM literature describes a
complex suite of relationship variables that might provides some clear insights to the improvement of
monopolistic relationships within UK DP as long as one is wary of those aspects based upon
assumptions of free market choice. These are illustrated in Figure 7 where we have juxtaposed a
selection of business relationship 'antidotes' to the essentially negative factors in Williamson’s (1975)
Economic Organisations Failure Framework.
TAKE IN FIGURE 7
Bounded Rationality might be reversed by enabling mutual creativity through open contracts, joint
innovation, applying stretch targets, ensuring disputes are resolved quickly and fairly and by taking a
long-term view of the relationship (Ganesan, 1994). Uncertainty/Complexity could be overcome by
building relationship stability and creating a framework for successful business. This could include
working more closely with fewer partners (Lewin & Johnston, 1997), pursuing mutual objectives
through value creation, joint investment and harmonised processes and, building interdependence
through C3 Behaviour (Moss Kanter, 1994). Creating a communication environment optimised for
success might defeat information Impactedness (Sheth & Sharma, 1997). This could involve
implementing multiple communication links at all level between firms (Mohr & Spekman, 1994, Morgan
& Hunt, 1994) including KAM, IS, sharing business and design data, objective performance
measurement and responding quickly the other party’s needs (MacDonald et al, 1997). Opportunism
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requires measures to strengthen the relationship by creating a reliable business infrastructure; a focus
on the quality of the relationship outputs is key as is clarity over the boundaries of the relationship. A
creative approach to conflict and problem solving (Hatch, 1997), building goodwill, trust and
commitment by incrementally building on achievements could create the necessary ingredients of a
virtuous circle (Goleman, 1998). Lastly, Small Numbers might be addressed by incentivising a quality
relationship with highly rewarding, shared gains (Watson, 1999) and, both sides feel empowered to
strive dynamically for the mutual good and true equity to overcome power imbalance (Eisenhardt al,
1997).
We pose the following Research Question: To determine if it is possible to obtain an understanding of
the monopolistic relationships within UK DP using the theoretical lens of Williamson’s (1975)
Organisations Failure Framework combined with RM’s relational and behavioural factors.
Operationalising the Model
A triangulated data capture approach was designed using both quantitative (questionnaire) and
qualitative (semi-structured interview) methods, which aimed to measure perceptions from both
relationship sides. Operationalisation of the research instrument concentrated on the 5 dimensions of
the theoretical model in Figure 7 using a 5 point Likert scale (Youngman, 1984) with questions
grounded in the literature. The dimensions and 37 questions which achieved a satisfactory 0.7977
level of Coefficient Alpha in the study (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997) are shown in Appendix 1. The
semi-structured interview design involved following-up the dominant quantitative results by capturing
‘why’ information from senior relationship managers for each dimension of the relationship in question
i.e. what were the key factors that resulted in success or failure? By this additional means it was
intended to obtain the richness of perceptions needed to gain insight into the subtleties and cultural
depth of the business problem.
The Pilot Project
In order to test the research approach, a pilot project was carried out which examined both Industry
and MoD perspectives of a current, UK DP relationship. This was a true monopoly worth £40m per
year for the purchase of aircraft spare parts and the provision of repair services. Questionnaires were
administered to both team leaders and their staffs and a 100% response was received from the 50
respondents. The survey was followed-up by 30 minute semi-structured interviews with the 2 team
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leaders. The joint statistical results are summarised in Figure 8 and, together with the semis-
structured interview key points must be treated with some circumspection because of the small
sample of respondents.
TAKE IN FIGURE 8
Nevertheless, they enable the following observations to be made:
 The Model: Although the overall relationship satisfaction score of 47% bears out the
predominantly negative prediction of Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework, those
of the 5 dimensions are neither uniformly optimistic nor pessimistic. The use of the theoretical
model thus allows a pattern of results to be discerned for a particular business relationship.
 Bounded Rationality – Creativity 53%: There was some evidence of a desire to improve service
quality but low performance expectations were caused by a lack of joint activities to improve
planning and problem-solving.
 Uncertainty/Complexity – Stability 28%: This result highlights an unwillingness to take a long-term
view of the relationship by investing in relationship-building (adaptive) measures such as
improved commercial and business processes.
 Information Impactedness – Communication 58%: Despite the rating, both team leaders
mentioned the poor quality of shared data and their fear that the other party would use honest
performance figures as a weapon against them. Nevertheless despite this lack of trust, actions to
improve matters such as staff exchanges, were being taken which indicated a desire to seek
better adaption.
 Opportunism – Reliability 34%: This result highlights a mutual lack of confidence and trust in
the ability of the other to deliver the contract outputs. The view appeared to be based upon poor
C3 and opportunistic behaviours over pricing and service delivery moreover, it was mentioned
that tensions in the relationship were destructive rather than constructive.
 Small Numbers - Quality 57%: Overall, the parties expressed feelings of helplessness at their
inability to find ways to improve the relationship and achieve an equitable arrangement although
one remarked that the other’s acknowledgement of poor performance in the survey was at least a
start.
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 RM: The Pilot Study considered a monopoly where there was patently a poor relationship and as
predicted by the model, negative behaviours were observed for which RM enabled a useful
understanding. However, a larger sample is required to establish a clear view of the dynamics.
 Business Perspective: The team leaders mentioned that the detailed charts which provided a
comparison of the parties’ views question by question had, for the first time, given them a clear
perspective of the relationship and would allow them to start detailed discussions on improvement
measures.
Conclusion
Within the business environment and the RM literature in particular, much study has identified the key
relational dynamics and success factors. However, in the area of sustained, full monopolies there is
little theory supported by empirically derived evidence. The authors have identified a substantial
enterprise which annually spends over £10bn per year and where very powerful actors, the UK MoD
and Defence Industries, are locked into relationships which potentially disempower their efforts to
obtain adequate value for money for tax-payers and profits for shareholders. This paper considered
the face value of Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework providing a realistic lens
through which to view UK DP monopolistic business-to-business relationships and the suitability of RM
as an ‘idiom’ capable of describing them. The results of a Pilot Project have confirmed the validity
and feasibility of this exploratory research approach and the authors now intend to extend their project
to a further 53 monopolistic relationships. This will allow Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure
Framework and RM theories to be tested empirically in a business environment which has received
scant attention by Management Researchers. There will also be immense practical benefits if it is
possible to help UK DP managers to improve the performance of their business.
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Appendix 1 – Questionnaire Dimensions and Questions
1. Bounded Rationality - Creativity: promoting quality, innovation and long-term approach by
encouraging high performance.
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by both parties ie. reliable
equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts.
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business.
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards.
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'.
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'.
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us.
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success.
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a solution than
hold each other to the original contract terms.
2. Uncertainty/Complexity - Stability: synchronisation of objectives and confidence building.
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business.
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated.
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible.
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly.
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both parties can seek
increasing rewards.
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party.
3. Information Impactedness - Communication: shared data environment, openness, common
performance measures, frequent interaction.
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve the performance of the joint
business, it is freely available.
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and pricing information
are made freely available.
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support chain from sub-
contractors to end-user.
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally – not just
according to specified agreement.
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship.
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the support chain from sub-
contractors to end-user.
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-range forecasts to
enable him to do his business better.
4 Opportunism - Reliability: concentrating on service and product delivery, lowering joint costs and
risks, building up trust.
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is entirely satisfactory.
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is entirely satisfactory.
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos.
d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner.
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put himself out to adapt to
our changing requirements.
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests.
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly.
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality improvement ideas.
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us.
j. The other party always does what he says he will do.
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5. Small Numbers - Quality: creating a win-win relationship in which each side is delighted to be a
part.
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties.
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the current relationship.
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship partner.
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship.
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds.
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship.
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Figure 2. Economic Organisations Failure Framework (adapted from Williamson (1975)
 Destructive competition
 Reduced Business Gains










































Axelrod, 1984 X X
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Doney & Cannon, 1997 X
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Madhok, 2000 X X X
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Figure 4. The Commitment-Trust Theory with Possible Monopoly Components
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 First Generation Partnering:
 Agreeing mutual objectives.
 Making decisions and resolving problems openly as agree at the start of the project.
 Aiming at targets that provide continuous measurable improvements.
 Second Generation Partnering:
 Develop strategy jointly.
 Embrace participating firms fully.
 Ensure equity by allowing all to be rewarded on the basis of fair prices and profits.
 Integrate firms through co-operation and trust.
 Benchmark performance accurately.
 Establish best practice processes and procedures.
 React to feedback positively and quickly.
 Third Generation Partnering:
 Understand the client’s business and its success factors.
 Take joint responsibility for key outputs.
 Turn the main processes into a seamless chain of value-adding activities.
 Mobilise full partnership development expertise.
 Create expert teams and Key Account Managers.
 Innovate jointly.
























 Joint Project Teams
 IS links





















Figure 7. A Conceptual Framework for Research – Williamson’s (1975)
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Figure 8. Results of Pilot Project Questionnaire Survey
